Thoughts from Inside the Wire

Editor's Note: Reboot

Fri, 28 May 2010 13:40:29 -0400

As you might have noticed, the title has changed. As has the theme. This is indicative of a new focus on this page; I hope you’ll find my new content, explained below, a bit more fulfilling (and frequently-posted) than before.

•

“The Wire” refers to the security perimeter surrounding a military FOB, or Forward Operating Base. Military operations are conducted “outside the wire.” This is where split second decisions are made – where saving lives trumps grand strategy.

Outside the wire, idealism meets reality and succumbs to it in full. Academia has a very small role there. This blog recognizes that primary shortcoming; I have rebooted the page in an effort to show how ivory tower security theory can sometimes mesh with on the ground decision making, and also how it frequently fails. This is a place for my analysis of global security issues, and critiques of others’ analysis. While I admit that I will likely stray from those stated purposes occasionally, I plan to keep my information relevant and academically interesting for those that share my passion for international security issues.

September 29. FedEx Field (home of the Washington Redskins),...

Mon, 29 Jun 2009 17:18:00 -0400

September 29. FedEx Field (home of the Washington Redskins), Landover, Maryland. Going to be there!

Is Iran Ripe for a Revolution? (from Slate Magazine)

Tue, 23 Jun 2009 23:18:43 -0400

Is Iran Ripe for a Revolution? (from Slate Magazine):

Best article I’ve read on the elections all day, and it’s much closer to the tenth or fifteenth than the first. Furthermore, Byman’s thoughts and opinions on the aftermath of the elections, and the continued viability of the protests, very closely mirror my own. +1 for Slate.

Timeline of Post-Election Events in Iran

Tue, 23 Jun 2009 11:38:00 -0400

Timeline of Post-Election Events in Iran

The Iranian Election and the Revolution Test

Mon, 22 Jun 2009 17:56:27 -0400

By George Friedman — 22 June, 2009

Successful revolutions have three phases. First, a strategically located single or limited segment of society begins vocally to express resentment, asserting itself in the streets of a major city, usually the capital. This segment is joined by other segments in the city and by segments elsewhere as the demonstration spreads to other cities and becomes more assertive, disruptive and potentially violent. As resistance to the regime spreads, the regime deploys its military and security forces. These forces, drawn from resisting social segments and isolated from the rest of society, turn on the regime, and stop following the regime’s orders. This is what happened to the Shah of Iran in 1979; it is also what happened in Russia in 1917 or in Romania in 1989.

Revolutions fail when no one joins the initial segment, meaning the initial demonstrators are the ones who find themselves socially isolated. When the demonstrations do not spread to other cities, the demonstrations either peter out or the regime brings in the security and military forces — who remain loyal to the regime and frequently personally hostile to the demonstrators — and use force to suppress the rising to the extent necessary. This is what happened in Tiananmen Square in China: The students who rose up were not joined by others. Military forces who were not only loyal to the regime but hostile to the students were brought in, and the students were crushed.

A Question of Support
This is also what happened in Iran this week. The global media, obsessively focused on the initial demonstrators — who were supporters of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponents — failed to notice that while large, the demonstrations primarily consisted of the same type of people demonstrating. Amid the breathless reporting on the demonstrations, reporters failed to notice that the uprising was not spreading to other classes and to other areas. In constantly interviewing English-speaking demonstrators, they failed to note just how many of the demonstrators spoke English and had smartphones. The media thus did not recognize these as the signs of a failing revolution.

Later, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke Friday and called out the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, they failed to understand that the troops — definitely not drawn from what we might call the “Twittering classes,” would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons. The troops had about as much sympathy for the demonstrators as a small-town boy from Alabama might have for a Harvard postdoc. Failing to understand the social tensions in Iran, the reporters deluded themselves into thinking they were witnessing a general uprising. But this was not St. Petersburg in 1917 or Bucharest in 1989 — it was Tiananmen Square.

In the global discussion last week outside Iran, there was a great deal of confusion about basic facts. For example, it is said that the urban-rural distinction in Iran is not critical any longer because according to the United Nations, 68 percent of Iranians are urbanized. This is an important point because it implies Iran is homogeneous and the demonstrators representative of the country. The problem is the Iranian definition of urban — and this is quite common around the world — includes very small communities (some with only a few thousand people) as “urban.” But the social difference between someone living in a town with 10,000 people and someone living in Tehran is the difference between someone living in Bastrop, Texas and someone living in New York. We can assure you that that difference is not only vast, but that most of the good people of Bastrop and the fine people of New York would probably not see the world the same way. The failure to understand the dramatic diversity of Iranian society led observers to assume that students at Iran’s elite university somehow spoke for the rest of the country.

Tehran proper has about 8 million inhabitants; its suburbs bring it to about 13 million people out of Iran’s total population of 70.5 million. Tehran accounts for about 20 percent of Iran, but as we know, the cab driver and the construction worker are not socially linked to students at elite universities. There are six cities with populations between 1 million and 2.4 million people and 11 with populations of about 500,000. Including Tehran proper, 15.5 million people live in cities with more than 1 million and 19.7 million in cities greater than 500,000. Iran has 80 cities with more than 100,000. But given that Waco, Texas, has more than 100,000 people, inferences of social similarities between cities with 100,000 and 5 million are tenuous. And with metro Oklahoma City having more than a million people, it becomes plain that urbanization has many faces.

Winning the Election With or Without Fraud
We continue to believe two things: that vote fraud occurred, and that Ahmadinejad likely would have won without it. Very little direct evidence has emerged to establish vote fraud, but several things seem suspect.

For example, the speed of the vote count has been taken as a sign of fraud, as it should have been impossible to count votes that fast. The polls originally were to have closed at 7 p.m. local time, but voting hours were extended until 10 p.m. because of the number of voters in line. By 11:45 p.m. about 20 percent of the vote had been counted. By 5:20 a.m. the next day, with almost all votes counted, the election commission declared Ahmadinejad the winner. The vote count thus took about seven hours. (Remember there were no senators, congressmen, city council members or school board members being counted — just the presidential race.) Intriguingly, this is about the same time in took in 2005, though reformists that claimed fraud back then did not stress the counting time in their allegations.

The counting mechanism is simple: Iran has 47,000 voting stations, plus 14,000 roaming stations that travel from tiny village to tiny village, staying there for a short time before moving on. That creates 61,000 ballot boxes designed to receive roughly the same number of votes. That would mean that each station would have been counting about 500 ballots, or about 70 votes per hour. With counting beginning at 10 p.m., concluding seven hours later does not necessarily indicate fraud or anything else. The Iranian presidential election system is designed for simplicity: one race to count in one time zone, and all counting beginning at the same time in all regions, we would expect the numbers to come in a somewhat linear fashion as rural and urban voting patterns would balance each other out — explaining why voting percentages didn’t change much during the night.

It has been pointed out that some of the candidates didn’t even carry their own provinces or districts. We remember that Al Gore didn’t carry Tennessee in 2000. We also remember Ralph Nader, who also didn’t carry his home precinct in part because people didn’t want to spend their vote on someone unlikely to win — an effect probably felt by the two smaller candidates in the Iranian election.

That Mousavi didn’t carry his own province is more interesting. Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett writing in Politico make some interesting points on this. As an ethnic Azeri, it was assumed that Mousavi would carry his Azeri-named and -dominated home province. But they also point out that Ahmadinejad also speaks Azeri, and made multiple campaign appearances in the district. They also point out that Khamenei is Azeri. In sum, winning that district was by no means certain for Mousavi, so losing it does not automatically signal fraud. It raised suspicions, but by no means was a smoking gun.

We do not doubt that fraud occurred during Iranian election. For example, 99.4 percent of potential voters voted in Mazandaran province, a mostly secular area home to the shah’s family. Ahmadinejad carried the province by a 2.2 to 1 ratio. That is one heck of a turnout and level of support for a province that lost everything when the mullahs took over 30 years ago. But even if you take all of the suspect cases and added them together, it would not have changed the outcome. The fact is that Ahmadinejad’s vote in 2009 was extremely close to his victory percentage in 2005. And while the Western media portrayed Ahmadinejad’s performance in the presidential debates ahead of the election as dismal, embarrassing and indicative of an imminent electoral defeat, many Iranians who viewed those debates — including some of the most hardcore Mousavi supporters — acknowledge that Ahmadinejad outperformed his opponents by a landslide.

Mousavi persuasively detailed his fraud claims Sunday, and they have yet to be rebutted. But if his claims of the extent of fraud were true, the protests should have spread rapidly by social segment and geography to the millions of people who even the central government asserts voted for him. Certainly, Mousavi supporters believed they would win the election based in part on highly flawed polls, and when they didn’t, they assumed they were robbed and took to the streets.

But critically, the protesters were not joined by any of the millions whose votes the protesters alleged were stolen. In a complete hijacking of the election by some 13 million votes by an extremely unpopular candidate, we would have expected to see the core of Mousavi’s supporters joined by others who had been disenfranchised. On last Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, when the demonstrations were at their height, the millions of Mousavi voters should have made their appearance. They didn’t. We might assume that the security apparatus intimidated some, but surely more than just the Tehran professional and student classes posses civic courage. While appearing large, the demonstrations actually comprised a small fraction of society.

Tensions Among the Political Elite
All of this not to say there are not tremendous tensions within the Iranian political elite. That no revolution broke out does not mean there isn’t a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics. But that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it. Many of Iran’s religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, as threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international risks they don’t want to take. Ahmadinejad’s political popularity in fact rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national security issues.

The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme leader, faced a difficult choice last Friday. He could demand a major recount or even new elections, or he could validate what happened. Khamenei speaks for a sizable chunk of the ruling elite, but also has had to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces. Many powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to reverse the election, and we suspect Khamenei wished he could have found a way to do it. But as the defender of the regime, he was afraid to. Mousavi supporters’ demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters — both voters and the security forces — had their candidate been denied. Khamenei wasn’t going to flirt with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome.

The Western media misunderstood this because they didn’t understand that Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them, that many of the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous pull in the country’s security apparatus. The reason Western media missed this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election, therefore failing to see Ahmadinejad’s support and the widespread dissatisfaction with the old clerical elite. The Western media simply didn’t understand that the most traditional and pious segments of Iranian society support Ahmadinejad because he opposes the old ruling elite. Instead, they assumed this was like Prague or Budapest in 1989, with a broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular regime.

Tehran in 2009, however, was a struggle between two main factions, both of which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses. And there also was the small faction the BBC and CNN kept focusing on — the demonstrators in the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in various ways, however. Ahmadinejad used it to make his case that the clerics who supported them, like Rafsanjani, would risk the revolution and play into the hands of the Americans and British to protect their own wealth. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani argued behind the scenes that the unrest was the tip of the iceberg, and that Ahmadinejad had to be replaced. Khamenei, an astute politician, examined the data and supported Ahmadinejad.

Now, as we saw after Tiananmen Square, we will see a reshuffling among the elite. Those who backed Mousavi will be on the defensive. By contrast, those who supported Ahmadinejad are in a powerful position. There is a massive crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite. Having been forced by the election and Khamenei to live with Ahmadinejad, some will make deals while some will fight — but Ahmadinejad is well-positioned to win this battle.

My Thoughts

First of all, Friedman’s theory ignores one very substantial element of the Iranian “revolution”. If the Supreme Leader is unwilling to use his ability to remove a candidate from office that is a challenge to his own power (Ahmadinejad) doesn’t that mean that the Ayatollah’s supremacy is nullified? By stating that “Khamenei wasn’t going to flirt with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome” doesn’t Friedman insinuate that Khamenei’s power has waned, replaced by the subtle and unannounced takeover of the Iranian government by its “security apparatus”, a thinly-veiled reference to the Sepah Pasdaran? If so, we have all been fooled, and the Green Revolution has only weakened the clerics enough to convert Iran into a virtual military dictatorship.

However, if this is not true and the military does not have such subtle and far-reaching power, Friedman must admit that the Sea of Green revolution has yet to run its course. Detractors of the revolution dismiss it, saying, to paraphrase, that it has not gathered enough steam to challenge the establishment. This is blatantly incorrect—the early stages of revolution are never marked by outright victory. One need turn no further back in the history books than the 1979 Islamic Revolution to realize that a second massive upheaval in Tehran could take months before a form of stabilization is reached.

Finally I believe that Friedman’s analysis that “the demonstrations primarily consisted of the same type of people demonstrating” is also glaringly false. Does he not recall the images of old women clad in black chador’s protesting alongside female university students in green headscarves? Does he not recall the images of twenty-something males throwing bricks at the Basij alongside men who could have been their grandfathers? Does he ignore the logical thought that, because at least 2/3 of the population of Iran is under the age of 35, it makes sense for many of the protesters to look the same?

I am not so bold as to say that Friedman’s analysis is incorrect—it simply leaves some broad gaps that I neither agree with nor am willing to ignore. I am only sure that we have not heard the last of the Sea of Green, and it is unwise to already speak of them in the past tense.

Creativity, Perserverance and Technology: Overthrowing bad...

Mon, 22 Jun 2009 15:08:47 -0400

Creativity, Perserverance and Technology: Overthrowing bad governments for as long as they’ve existed.

The Detrimental Effects of Political Parties on American Democracy

Mon, 22 Jun 2009 12:55:56 -0400

“If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all.”
– Thomas Jefferson (Letter to Francis Hopkinson, 1789)

Multiple fundamental flaws are incorporated in the American Constitution. Many—States’ rights, the legality of slavery, the American tendency toward isolation—have been resolved through legislation, conflict and or political evolution. However, the dominance of two political parties—or the presence of any political parties at all—is an issue of utmost importance that must be considered by the American people. James Madison, in his The Federalist, No. 10, wrote: “A zeal for different opinions … an attachment to different leaders … or to persons of other descriptions … have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate [sp] for their common good.” The American political tendency toward partisan alignment must be revolutionized; without such an improvement to our political fabric, democracy itself is at risk.

George Washington, in his famous Farewell Address, also considered the topic of political parties. “The common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it,” he said. He, Madison and Jefferson vehemently objected to the divisions caused by parties. However, parties have taken a firm grip on American politics, threatening to unravel the threads of our political tapestry. But why? The answer lies in the machinations of modern politicians. While the American people are disgusted with partisan politics, as evidenced by the growing support of third-party candidates in recent Presidential elections, restrictions such as the 15% Barrier and the lack of funding to lesser-known candidates results in little, if any, public exposure for candidates outside Washington’s inner circle. Indeed, it is virtually impossible for a third-party candidate to win major political office. The last viable Presidential candidate from either major party was Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. Since, only Ross Perot has truly competed in a Presidential race, winning 18.9% of the popular vote in the election of 1992.

The two major American political parties hold our citizenry hostage. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his Social Contract, wrote: “[W]hen factions arise … the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members … it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations. The differences become less numerous and give a less general result … in this case there is no longer a general will…” Rousseau’s most important point throughout the work is the importance of the general will as determined by the votes of each citizen. He notes, however, that factions—political parties—destroy the validity of the general will. If the essence of the body politic is contaminated, how, then, is the government valid? In short, it is not. The government is controlled not by the people, but instead by the dominating whims of political parties formed by the alliances of our elected officials. The people are forced to choose between one of two feasible candidates for President, and most other elected offices. Indeed, the Democratic and Republican Parties have eliminated the citizens’ right to choose. Election reform must be instituted to rein in our two political parties, a system that has proven detrimental to the political climate of our nation. The stains on our political tapestry must be cleansed before bipartisan politics tears it asunder.

We must change nearly every aspect of American politics, from the nature of modern debates—most minor candidates are barred from participation as a result of the 15% Barrier—to campaign funding—due to the incredibly high cost of television ads, travel and other political expenses, low funding prevents candidates from spreading their message—and everything in between. These policies of the modern political machine prevent many potential candidates from bidding for public office, a policy that is contrary to the law of the Constitution itself. This machine must be dismantled—otherwise its tendency to smolder might burst into flame and devour the tapestry that is our political cloth.

Political parties are no longer necessary in America. While the Democratic Party threw most of its weight behind Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Primary Election, Barack Obama won the contest, in part due to his use of the Internet. This illustrates that in the Information Age, parties are no longer integral in the education of our people. All the information we need to educate ourselves is at our fingertips, proving that the political party is no longer necessary for the citizenry to properly select a candidate. Indeed, with this function nullified, parties have no purpose in modern America, and therefore should logically be removed from the political system. While detractors may allege that a multiparty system will not work here, the governments of Japan and India, where multiple parties have contributed to a rich political climate, are a perfect example of successful governments without the detrimental effects of limited political choice.

The party is unnecessary to the modern political climate of the United States. Furthermore, it is detrimental to the American people, in that it limits the political freedoms of the citizens. The political party has been criticized since the dawn of Democracy, and, while marginally beneficial on the surface, in the end, causes deeper harm to the American political system. Because of this, we must abolish political parties—we must return political freedom to the hands of the People. As Jefferson wrote in his Letter to John Dickinson, “The greatest good we can do our country is to heal its party divisions and make them one people.”

WORKS CITED:

Jefferson, Thomas. Letter to Francis Hopkinson. 1789. Paris, France.

Madison, James. “Federalist No. 10.” Daily Advertiser [New York City] 22 Nov. 1787.

Washington, George. Washington’s Farewell Address. Comp. Charles W. Eliot. American Historical Documents. Vol. 43. The Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909-1914.

“1992 Presidential General Election Results.” Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. Ed. David Leip. 2005. 8 Jan. 2009 <http://www.uselectionatlas.org/>.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Trans. Maurice Cranston. New York: Penguin Classics, 1969.

Jefferson, Thomas. Letter to John Dickinson. 23 July 1801. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. New York: Paul Leicester Ford, 1892-99.

Dealing With A Resurgent Russia

Sun, 21 Jun 2009 21:54:41 -0400

As the Kremlin Plays Hardball, It’s Time for Washington to Play Chess

When Barack Obama entered the Oval Office last January, he was faced with a multitude of world problems, none of which were, are or will be easy to solve. Over the course of five months, he has spent billions of dollars to resurrect failing financial institutions and corporations; he has announced a tentative date for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq; he has officially shifted the focus of the U.S. military to the difficult task of winning our forgotten war in Afghanistan; he has initiated diplomatic talks with our former enemies, from the Castro regime in Cuba to Chavez’s Venezuela. However, despite all of these successes, and despite Obama’s efforts, American relations with Russia, an important partner in the War on Terrorism only six years ago, have continued to deteriorate.

Russia is desperately rebuilding her international prestige and domestic infrastructure, all to erase the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Moscow is still the capital of a second-tier state that has yet to even construct the means to regain a sphere of influence similar to that seen during the Soviet era; incongruously, the Kremlin’s Foreign Ministry has already begun to exert impressive influence over its former satellites, much to the dismay of American strategists, as the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs has dryly noted:

“Over the past several years, Russia has increased its international profile, played an increasing role in regional issues, and been more assertive in dealing with its neighbors. The rise in energy prices has given it leverage over countries dependent on Russian sources. Russia continues to support separatist regimes in Georgia and Moldova.”

Given these stark changes in policy, the United States and the rest of the world powers must decide how to receive a Russia that has rejected Western ideals in favor of a new plan of domestic and international policy, and they must decide quickly. The West must see that its practices are only propping up an ever-more-belligerent Russia, and that the best answer to the Kremlin’s hard politics will not involve a carrot-and-stick mentality. Instead, we must pressure Russia with the same decisive policies they have chosen for us while taking special care to avoid international political blunders such as the War in Iraq and the hollow promises made to second- and third-tier states around the world. We must show Russia that it is not, and will not be, ready to assume a role similar to that of the United States on the international stage.

(for full text, please contact andrewmullikin@seidata.com)

"Hope and Change -- but Not for Iran" by Charles Krauthammer for The Washington Post

Sun, 21 Jun 2009 16:18:16 -0400

"Hope and Change -- but Not for Iran" by Charles Krauthammer for The Washington Post:

A concise and well-written article critisizing the Obama administration’s response to the ongoing protests and outrage in Iran. Despite your views on Obama’s mainstream policies, his handling of this crisis has done nothing to promote the Iranian efforts toward democracy, a move contrary to what the United States has stood for since Harry Truman occupied the Oval Office.

Mousavi's new revolutionary manifesto

Sun, 21 Jun 2009 14:34:51 -0400

Mousavi's new revolutionary manifesto:

garysick:

Today, Mir Hossein Mousavi, the presidential candidate who has come to represent the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people, issued a formal statement. The text is available at the title link.

Although he denounces the “lies and fraud” of the leadership, particularly in the recent election, he views the fraudulent election as only as the symptom of something far more serious. He describes a revolution gone wrong, a revolution that was originally based on attention to the voice of the people but has resulted in “forcing an unwanted government on the nation.”

This moment is “a turning point,” he says, and he defines the ” the movement that is forming around him of having a “historical mission” to accomplish nothing less than “renewing the life of the nation” according to its own ideals.

He acknowledges, interestingly, that his own voice at the beginning was less ‘eloquent’ than he would have wished and that the people were ahead of him in turning the movement green. But now he accepts the “burden of duty put on our shoulders by the destiny of generations and ages”

He denounces both extremes of the political spectrum: those on one hand who believe that “Islamic government is the same as Tyranny of the Rightful;” and on the other, those who “consider religion and Islam to be blockers for realization of republicanism,” i.e. those who believe that Islam and democracy are incompatible.

Mousavi says his call for annulment of the election and a revote, supervised by an impartial national body, “is a given right.” Theobjective is nothing less than “to achieve a new type of political life in the country.”

That is truly a revolutionary statement. He says he will stand by the side of all those seeking “new solutions” in a non-violent way. He accepts the principles and the institutions of the Islamic Republic, including the Revolutionary Guard and the basij, but denounces “deviations and deceptions.” He demands reform “that returns us to the pure principles of the Islamic Revolution.”

He calls for freedom of expression in alll its forms, and says that if the government permits people to express their views “there won’t be a need for the presence of military and regulatory forces in the streets.”

It is apparent from this statement that Mousavi’s movement — and Mousavi himself — have evolved enormously in the past week. The candidate started as a mild-mannered reformer. After the searing events of the past several days, he has dared to preach a counter sermon to Khamene’i’s lecture on Islamic government. Although he never mentions the Leader by name, there is no overlooking the direct contradiction of his arguments. This open opposition to the Leader by a political figure is unprecedented.

Mousavi has in fact issued a manifesto for a new vision of the Islamic Republic. The repression and disdain of the government has brought the opposition to a place they probably never dreamed of going. And no one knows where any of the parties are likely to go next.

But for outside observers, it is like standing on the edge of a glacier and feeling the ice begin to crack under your feet.

Please retweet: sign petition ‘Petition to let Mousavi’s speech be aired’ -...

Sat, 20 Jun 2009 11:48:37 -0400

Please retweet: sign petition ‘Petition to let Mousavi’s speech be aired’ - http://301.to/2ju #Iranelection RT RT RT

Photo

Sat, 20 Jun 2009 00:53:46 -0400

"I will participate in the demonstrations tomorrow. Maybe they will turn violent. Maybe I will be..."

Sat, 20 Jun 2009 00:48:00 -0400

“I will participate in the demonstrations tomorrow. Maybe they will turn violent. Maybe I will be one of the people who is going to get killed. I’m listening to all my favorite music. I even want to dance to a few songs. I always wanted to have very narrow eyebrows. Yes, maybe I will go to the salon before I go tomorrow! There are a few great movie scenes that I also have to see. I should drop by the library, too. It’s worth to read the poems of Forough and Shamloo again. All family pictures have to be reviewed, too. I have to call my friends as well to say goodbye. All I have are two bookshelves which I told my family who should receive them. I’m two units away from getting my bachelors degree but who cares about that. My mind is very chaotic. I wrote these random sentences for the next generation so they know we were not just emotional and under peer pressure. So they know that we did everything we could to create a better future for them. So they know that our ancestors surrendered to Arabs and Mongols but did not surrender to despotism. This note is dedicated to tomorrow’s children…”

- an Iranian blogger

8 Hours

Sat, 20 Jun 2009 00:42:45 -0400

To continue my “countdown” theme from yesterday, I write now as time is ticking away in Tehran. As the title of this indicates, in roughly eight hours’ time from now—0830 EDT, 1600 Tehran time—the “Sea of Green” protesters will almost certainly come face-to-face with an opposition vastly stronger and more formidible than anything they have seen thus far in their attempts to show the despotic theocrats of the Iranian government that the latter part of the phrase “Islamic Republic” has become vastly more important over the past thirty years.

Tomorrow, instead of the Basijis striking out with truncheons and fists, protesters will be greeted by the formidible Sepah e Pasdaran, known in the West as the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the elite shock troops founded in defense of the Islamic Republic’s ideals. And, no matter how tarnished these ideals may have become, the Pasdaran are likely to defend them to the death.

This much can be counted on; protesters will march, once again, from Revolution Square to Freedom Square, and somewhere along the way, the Pasdaran will be waiting for them. The question is not “what will happen when the two groups meet”; it is instead “what will happen afterwards?”

The Iranian people, by and large, are obviously not happy with their government: this is clear when one thinks of the estimated three million people per day who have protested Ahmadinejad’s reelection. While the Ayatollah might think that “Flexing muscles on the streets after the election is not right” he is patently wrong. The soul of democracy lives in the right to protest, the right to change. To challenge the establishment is NOT to challenge democracy, it is to allow democracy to flourish.

This is what the Iranian people must realize— that this is not a case of secular students attacking religion; this is not a bunch of spoiled, wealthy and radical children with nothing to do; this is not a fight for or against any particular candidate—instead, it is a battle of ideologies, a fight for the basic freedoms inherent in democracy, basic freedoms long denied to a people who have, throughout history, flourished, but who have lately been oppressed by poor rulers.

Finally, the Iranian people must realize that their battle—a battle of ideology—is the hardest to fight, and the hardest to win. Perseverence is the key. The “Sea of Green” might well run red in a few short hours. But no matter what is lost, one thing must remain—the Iranian people must remember the courage and drive they needed to get this far. Revolution, change, is about pushing limits. If the limit is not broken this time, they must simply keep pushing.

No one with a conscience and a clear mind could oppose the protesters in Tehran. Only time will tell if they are successful, only time will show how steely is the resolve of the patriotic Iranians who are risking their lives to create a better world. Eight hours from now, our questions will be answered—we will know what will happen when two vastly different groups collide.

And the answer may well shake the world.

“Together ants can defeat a lion.” — An Iranian proverb that we must hope is true.

From Gary Sick, definitely worth Reading

Sat, 20 Jun 2009 00:09:20 -0400

garysick:

Khamenei: The Speech

Iran’s Leader, Ayatollah Khamene`i, gave everyone a piece of his mind in his Friday speech. Here are my reactions:

First, and perhaps more important than the words themselves, was the fact that Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani did not attend. This is extraordinary. Khamene’i and Rafsanjani were fellow revolutionaries in 1978-79. They have been associates – sometimes close colleagues – for more than 50 years. Many believe that Rafsanjani was instrumental in getting Khamene’i his position as Leader. Rafsanjani today heads the Assembly of Experts, which is responsible for monitoring the performance of the Leader, among other things. This was possibly the single most fateful speech by Khamene’i in his 20 years as Leader of the Islamic Republic. How could Rafsanjani not attend? Did he simply boycott the event? Was he under house arrest? It probably didn’t help that several of Rafsanjani’s children were arrested in the previous 24 hours. We have never had such a graphic demonstration of political differences within Iran’s ruling elite.

Another non-attendee, presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, whom I regard as an almost accidental leader, now faces some of the most fateful decisions in at least the past twenty years of the Iranian revolution. He decided to run for president as a relatively unknown and uninspiring candidate who could offer solutions to some of Iran’s more pressing problems, especially on the economic side. His greatest attribute was the fact that he was “anybody but Ahmadinejad.” But his appearances with his charismatic wife, often holding hands, and the invention of the “green wave” struck a chord in the Iranian body politic. Then the extraordinary revulsion at the regime’s electoral numbers left a leadership void. He stepped in, rather tentatively at first, and filled that role. Two days ago he told the crowd that he was “willing to make sacrifices.” He realizes that there is zero tolerance by Iran’s rulers for anyone suspected of leading an opposition movement. His top supporters and associates have already been jailed, and he could face the same fate – or worse.

Khamene`i ‘s words were stark and simple. To paraphrase: the election is over, I fully support the person (Ahmadinejad) who won, it was fair, Iranians all trust their Islamic leaders, there will be no annulment, get over it and get off the streets or there will be harsh consequences, and besides it is all the work of outside agitators, especially the United States and Britain.

Tonight the streets of Tehran rang out with cries of allahu akbar and “death to the dictator,” suggesting that opposition has not vanished. A major demonstration has been announced by Mousavi for Saturday. If it proceeds and is substantial in numbers, it will be the first open flouting of opposition to the Leader, with the support of a number of key regime leaders, in more than twenty years.

Iran has always had the capacity to surprise. There are frantic decisions being made right now in the top leadership of the Revolutionary Guards, in the Leader’s office, in Mousavi’s team, and in kitchens and living rooms across the country as Iranians decide what they are going to do next. They don’t know how this will work out, and neither do we.

We do know that what they decide will be very important to the future of Iran, to Middle East politics, and to American policy. President Obama today went as far as he could prudently go by declaring:

I’ve said this throughout the week, I want to repeat it, that we stand with those who would look to peaceful resolution of conflict and we believe that the voices of people have to be heard, that that’s a universal value that the American people stand for and this administration stands for. And I’m very concerned, based on some of the tenor and tone of the statements that have been made, that the government of Iran recognize that the world is watching. And how they approach and deal with people who are — through peaceful means — trying to be heard will I think send a pretty clear signal to the international community about what Iran is and is not… . this is not an issue of the United States or the West versus Iran; this is an issue of the Iranian people.

But what he didn’t say was that it directly affects his policy of engagement. As long as the crisis persists, there is no chance that he can initiate meaningful negotiations with Iran.

He is also under immense and growing pressure – largely from people who deeply opposed the concept of engagement from the start – to take sides. And the pressure will grow, especially if there is a bloodletting by the regime in Iran. Obama’s statement today strikes me as typically precise and about as far as he can go without sliding into partisanship that will inevitably lead to escalating confrontation.

Despite the siren calls to give full vent to American outrage, short of widespread carnage he should recognize that such statements will not assist the beleaguered opposition in Iran. On the contrary, it will increase their vulnerability, raise false hopes of U.S. physical intervention, and will provide an excuse for the regime to carry out the kind of brutal repression that they are threatening, all in the name of fighting imperialism.

Shouts of outrage are fine by folks like me on the web, but the U.S. government should never forget that its primary task is to do no harm. It may be hard to hold your tongue, but then nobody ever said foreign policy was easy.

48 Hours

Thu, 18 Jun 2009 22:48:52 -0400

I, like many interested in the drama surrounding Iran’s June 11 elections, have barely been able to leave my computer for the past few days; instead I have eagerly watched as events that have the potential to literally recreate a nation have unfolded before my eyes. I have been stricken by the incredible persistence and nonviolence of the protesters—save, of course, for a few sporadic clashes with the thug-like Basij militia—and by the Iranian government’s willingness to allow the protests to proceed virtually unhindered. This is of course a vast simplification of the current climate in Tehran and other Iranian cities, but overall, there has yet to be a major clash between the “Sea of Green” protesters and the Iranian military, a fact that the protesters see as a major coup against their hardline government.

However, I’m afraid that the climate of these protests may soon change. In fact, I was stricken by the potential irony of a recent “tweet” from the Iranian micro-blogger “persiankiwi” (a source that has thus far proved both daring and accurate in its attempts to inform readers both in and outside Iran of the unfolding drama) that read: “hospital source - severe shortage of blood supplies accross ALL Iran hospitals - pls donate blood”. There is a definite possibility that Iranian hospitals, streets and gutters will soon have no shortage of blood.

Yes, this is a pessimistic view. However, the time to survey the situation bought early this week by Ayatollah Khamenei and his Guardian Council is trickling away quickly, almost as quickly as is their control of the events of what might be referred to in history books as Iran’s “Green Revolution.” Indeed, a revolution very well could be brewing. Unconfirmed reports of dissension in the ranks of the Sepah Pasdaran (commonly referred to in the West as the Revolutionary Guards Corps or IRGC), including rumors that commanders of the IRGC were arrested today, have been wildly circulating on the Internet, as have reports that the regular military and police have refused to engage the protesters. All of this leads one to believe the report that “All the violence in Iran is now ONLY by the Basij militia, they are beating people walking int he street for NO REASON”. If true, “President” Ahmadinejad may very well not need his return ticket from the SCO conference.

The problem lies in the plain likelihood that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad still have a few more tricks up their sleeve. The facts seem to say that the situation in Iran is only growing more tense—one report reads that “The security situation in Tehran is very dangerous - 100’s arrested every day” another notes that “Tehran hospital doctors are on 24 hour standby.” People have been advised to “travel in groups - always tell someone where u are going - dont go out unless needed” and “NOT to attend Friday prayers inTehran” that will be led by the Ayatollah himself. Finally, in a rather macabre final message before signing off for the night, Twitter users wrote that “political situ in Iran is v/complex - for every decision there are reasons - some we cannot mention here”.

With the climate growing more and more hostile in Iran, it is almost certain that we will see some sort of retaliation from Khamenei within 48 hours; hence the title of this post. The problem lies in predicting its ferocity, and outcome. For once, the liberal American media is playing a conservative card, refusing to recognize the possibility that the Sea of Green protesters could actually bring about change in Iran, simply waiting for a recreation of the Tiananmen Square massacre twenty years ago. There is a distinct possibility that tanks will start rolling—perhaps only a few hours from now—that the protests will be crushed, and that life under the dominating clerics (and, more importantly, the military) will become even more harsh and authoritarian. We could very well see that a military coup has occurred in Iran, as Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh recently argued in the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/opinion/17pletka.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper). Such a coup would not be surprising, in fact many Iran experts would openly acknowledge that events since Ahmadinejad’s first election in 2005 have indicated the Iranian military’s (specifically the IRGC’s) vastly expanded role in government. The bottom line is, there is a strong chance that the excitement of successful demonstrations may soon come to an end, despite the million-plus-strong Sea of Green’s best efforts.

All of that said, there is also a chance that the reports indicating that Khamenei and his loyal followers have lost their grip on Iran are true. There is a chance that Mousavi, the de facto if frequently-absent leader of the Sea of Green, will manage to wrest control of the presidential palace and all of the duties that residence infers away from Ahmadinejad. There is a chance that the people of Iran will overthrow the clerical system, its weaknesses exposed now that the Supreme Leader has admitted that his word is not infallible, creating a Westernized democracy that will serve as an example for oppressed Middle Easterners from Damascus to Riyadh. There is a chance that the Sea of Green will turn into the long-awaited Green Revolution, the first in a series of governmental upheavals not unlike the color revolutions seen in Eastern European countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And there is a chance that I’m full of shit, and that this is all wishful thinking.

The secret is, no one in the West really knows. This is what has glued us to our computer screens, waiting to see when the first significant blow will fall, when the die is finally cast. We have very little fact and vast amounts of speculation, a formula that leaves us ripe for high hopes and strong disappointments. At this point, it is hard to argue that the election wasn’t rigged. Perhaps Ahmadinejad did win a majority, but I find it impossible to believe that not one of the three opposition candidates managed to carry a majority in his hometown, as the election’s overseers claim. But at this point, the winner of the election is irrelevant. Six days ago, the Ayatollah chose a winner. Soon, he will have to decide whether or not to change his mind. The events of the following days will have an incredible impact not only in Iran, but also in the greater Middle East and perhaps even worldwide.

Those who understand the stakes at risk here understand why people have barely left their computers, they understand why these events matter. The rumblings of change have intensified into tremors in Iran, and, like it or not, earthquakes are coming.

Guardian Council agrees to investigate election complaints...

Thu, 18 Jun 2009 11:59:40 -0400

Guardian Council agrees to investigate election complaints http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8107192.stm #iranelection

LIST OF POSSIBLE FAKE TWITTER ACCOUNTS LINKED TO IRAN GOV http://twitspam.org/?p=1403 #IranElection

Thu, 18 Jun 2009 10:59:20 -0400

LIST OF POSSIBLE FAKE TWITTER ACCOUNTS LINKED TO IRAN GOV http://twitspam.org/?p=1403 #IranElection

"War is God’s way of teaching Americans Geography."

Thu, 18 Jun 2009 10:12:42 -0400

“War is God’s way of teaching Americans Geography.”

- Ambrose Bierce

http://www.flickr.com/photos/fhashemi/sets/72157619758530748/show/

Thu, 18 Jun 2009 10:05:32 -0400

http://www.flickr.com/photos/fhashemi/sets/72157619758530748/show/:

The most recent photos I’ve seen of the ongoing protests against the Iranian election. Definitely something worth checking out.